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Casenotes
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital: A Hospital's
Liability as a Health Care Provider
I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of hospitals as providers of health care has changed
significantly over the past two decades.' As a result of this change,
new theories of hospital liability have evolved.2 Only recently, for
example, hospitals have been held liable for providing negligent
care. 3 These new theories of hospital liability follow the Illinois
judiciary's long-time recognition of remedies for injuries resulting
from the negligent acts of physicians and other health care
practitioners.'
1. Simonson, CorporateNegligence: An Evolving Theory of HospitalLiability, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HOSPITAL LIABILITY 11

(1986). See also Bing v. Thunig, 2

N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), in which the court noted the following
with respect to the changing nature of hospitals:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does
not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead
simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects
the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ
on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes, as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and
treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action.
Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
2. Note, Theoriesfor Imposing Liability Upon Hospitalsfor MedicalMalpractice: Ostensible Agency and CorporateLiability, II WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 561 (1985).
3. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 333, 211
N.E.2d 253, 258 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (see infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text). See, e.g., Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 Ill. 2d 282, 289, 415
N.E.2d 390, 397 (1980) (standards of care applicable to hospitals must be proven by
expert testimony); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 359, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1255 (1977) (see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text); Ohligschlager v. Proctor
Community Hosp., 55 II. 2d 411, 420, 303 N.E.2d 392, 397 (1973) (see infra note 40 and
accompanying text); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 11. 2d 443, 457, 266
N.E.2d 897, 904 (1970) (see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text); Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 718, 399 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ist Dist. 1979) (see infra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text); Slater v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart, 20 Ill.
App. 3d 464, 469, 314 N.E.2d 715, 719 (Ist Dist. 1974) (see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text).
4. See, e-g., Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 329 (1860) (physician who holds himself out as a
professional and who fails to exercise the amount of reasonable care and skill that is
ordinarily possessed by a physician is liable); Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191
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Historically, under the doctrine of charitable immunity, hospitals did not have an affirmative duty under Illinois law to provide
medical care to patients.5 The Illinois Supreme Court abandoned
the doctrine of charitable immunity in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,6 in which the court held that a hospital
has an affirmative duty to provide quality medical care to its patients." In the recent decision of Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital,'
however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a hospital that had
dispensed and administered 9 psychotropic drugs did not have an
affirmative duty to warn its patients of the adverse side effects of
the drugs. 10
This Note first reviews the various theories of liability under
which hospitals have been found liable in the context of medical
malpractice actions." This Note then examines and analyzes the
Kirk decision as it relates to the liability of the hospital, 2 and
suggests that the hospital should have been found liable under the
theories of strict liability, vicarious liability, and corporate negligence. 13 This Note concludes that the public policy underpinnings
of Darling suggest an alternative theory that was not raised in
Kirk, but that would have required the court to find the hospital
N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist. 1963) (one who holds himself out as a physician is bound to exercise ordinary skill and care); Magana v. Elie, 108 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (2d

Dist. 1982) (physician breached a duty of care by refusing to treat a patient in need of
further care); Cram v. Showalter, 140 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 489 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1986)
(physician liable for negligently treating a preexisting injury).
5. Molchan & Sinn, Hospital Malpractice Problems: Defense Point of View, REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS AND PROFESSIONALS 27-1 (Ill. Inst. for C.L.E.)
1985. See generally Wattman v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N.E.2d 314

(1st Dist. 1942); Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 297 Ill. App. 488, 17
N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 1938); Mater v. Silver Cross Hosp., 285 Ill. App. 437, 2 N.E.2d
138 (2d Dist. 1936); Olander v. Johnson, 258 111. App. 89 (2d Dist. 1930); Armstrong v.
Wesley Hosp., 170 Ill. App. 81 (1st Dist. 1912).
6. 33 Il. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
7. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.

8. 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
9.

It is the medical practice in hospitals that physicians order the medication, phar-

macists dispense the medication, and nurses administer the medication. B. BERGERSEN,
PHARMACOLOGY IN NURSING 68, 75, 71 (13th ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
10. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
11. See infra notes 15-71 and accompanying text.
12. This Note examines only those issues raised by the Kirk decision relating specifi-

cally to the hospital's liability. Three other major issues identified in Kirk but not discussed in this Note include the liability of the physicians, the drug manufacturers (except
to the extent the reasoning used by the court in analyzing the liability of the drug manu-

facturers is relevant to the issue of the hospital's liability), and the patient-driver. In
addition, the concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Simon does not discuss the
liability of the hospital, and therefore will not be discussed in this' Note.
13.

See infra notes 72-149 and accompanying text.
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liable. 4
II.

THEORIES OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY

Modern hospitals offer a wide range of health care services.' 5
The purpose of modem hospitals is no longer merely to provide a
6
facility for physicians to render medical care independently.'
Rather, the broader purpose of modem hospitals is to provide
quality medical care.' 7 When hospitals fail in their obligation to
render appropriate patient care through the supervision of hospital
personnel, the hospital may be found vicariously liable to the injured party.' 8 Additionally, the doctrine of corporate liability 9 imposes upon hospitals an independent, affirmative, and nondelegable duty to provide quality medical care. 20 Lastly, under a
theory of strict liability, hospitals are not permitted to sell an inherently defective or unreasonably dangerous product without providing appropriate warnings.2
14. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
15. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
16. Southwick, The Hospitalas an Institution: Expanding Responsibilities Change its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 434 (1973).
17. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals supports the following principle: "There shall be an organized governing body .... that has overall responsibility for
the conduct of the hospital in a manner consonant with the hospital's objective of making
available high quality patient care." JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HospiTALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS

19 (1970). "Quality health care" is an

illusory phrase. Quality, defined as striving for excellence, WEBSTER'S NEw
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE

WORLD

1189 (college ed. 1968), must-be deter-

mined by the patient or public receiving health care.
18. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
19. When a hospital incorporates, it assumes the role of a comprehensive health care
center that is ultimately responsible for arranging and coordinating total health care.
Simonson, supra note 1, at 11. The corporate nature of a hospital not only establishes a
hospital's role in the delivery of health care services, but also provides the basis for the
hospital's liability for negligence. Id. at 12.
20. See Darling,33 I11. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258 (1965) (see infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text for further discussion). See also Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il1.
2d 348, 359, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977) (see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text
for further discussion); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716, 399
N.E.2d 198, 204 (1st Dist. 1979) (see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for further
discussion); Slater v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart, 20 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469, 314
N.E.2d 715, 719 (1st Dist. 1974) (see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text for further
discussion).
21. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 457, 266 N.E.2d
897, 904 (1970). For a further discussion of Cunningham, see infra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
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A. CharitableImmunity
Hospital-based medical care began in the early 1900's. 22 Traditionally, hospitals, as charitable institutions, were immune from liability.23 Hospitals simply provided a facility for doctors to treat
their patients, and doctors exercised their professional discretion in
providing medical treatment. 24 The charitable immunity doctrine,25 which was created in 1876,26 protected hospitals from any
form of liability through the 1940's.27 Although some jurisdictions
abolished the doctrine as early as 1942,28 Illinois finally abolished
the doctrine in 1965 when the Illinois Supreme Court held in Darling that a hospital has an affirmative duty to provide quality care
to its patients.29
B.

Vicarious Liability

Historically, hospitals have not been held vicariously liable 30 for
the actions of physicians because of the unique nature of the physi22. B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 164 (1987) [hereinafter FURROW].
23. Id. at 165.
24. Southwick, supra note 16, at 434.
25. The doctrine of charitable immunity was premised on a public policy notion that
either recipients of charity waived their right to recover damages when medical care was
rendered gratuitously or, because a hospital depends on charitable contributions, contributors would cease to contribute if the funds were used to pay tort claims. Note, supra
note 2, at 567.
26. McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876) (overruled in Colby v.
Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969)).
27. FURROW, supra note 22, at 165. See, e.g., Schoendorif v. Soc'y of New York
Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (doctrine of charitable immunity first announced in New York) (overruled in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957)); Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 I1. 381, 385, 75 N.E. 991, 993
(1905) (doctrine of charitable immunity first announced in Illinois) (overruled in Darling,
33 I1. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965)).
28. President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
29. Darling, 33 Il. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258 (1965). Cf. Moore v. Moyle, 405111.
555, 565, 92 N.E.2d 81, 86 (1950) (the doctrine was modified); Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., 18 I1. 2d 11, 38, 163 N.E.2d 89, 102 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 968 (the doctrine was invalidated as it applied to the public school system).
30. Under the principle of vicarious liability an employer may be charged with an
employee's tortious acts when such acts are committed within the scope of the employee's
employment. Note, supra note 2, at 564.
To sustain a cause of action for vicarious liability, a plaintiff must establish that an
employer had some degree of control over the method and means of an employee's work
at the time the act or omission occurred. Simonson, Vicarious Liability, PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, HOSPITAL LIABILITY

45 (1986). See also Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp.,

52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976), in which the New York Appellate Court found
that the test for determining vicarious liability "is one of control in respect to the manner
in which the work is to be done." Id. at 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529. Vicarious liability is
premised upon the public policy notion that employers who are engaged in an enterprise,
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cian-hospital relationship. 3' Hospitals typically hire physicians as

independent contractors, thereby protecting the hospital from liability for patient injuries.32
The courts have struggled with the physician's status as an independent contractor. 33 In the 1950's, the courts began to recognize the significance of hospitals as health care providers.3 4 At that
time, the principle of vicarious liability was established in the context of medical malpractice. 3 In Bing v. Thunig,36 the New York
Court of Appeals abandoned the immunity of hospitals for the actions of independent contractor physicians. The court stated that
"[t]he rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at
variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and
and who are thus in the best position to insure against the risk of injury, should bear the
cost of such injury rather than the innocent party to the act. Id.
31. Note, supra note 2, at 564. See, e.g., Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 Ill.
App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d 676 (3d Dist. 1972) (hospital not vicariously liable for alleged
wrongdoing of a physician who was on the medical staff of the hospital but who did not
receive salary or other compensation from the hospital); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 93 111. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (2d Dist. 1968) (vicarious liability
action against hospital failed because of insufficient evidence against the physician, the
alleged wrongdoer).
32. FURROW, supra note 22, at 169.
33. See Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (hospital held vicariously liable when it had the right to control standards of performance of a
physician employed by the hospital in order to perform an inherent and essential function
for the hospital); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (when a hospital
permits a physician to use drugs and equipment belonging to the hospital and the physician has a regular call schedule at the hospital, the physician acts as an agent for the
hospital, relieving patients of any obligation to determine the physician's status prior to
treatment); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977) (operating surgeon
who assumed control in operating room was liable for the acts of hospital employees
assisting in the operation, but both the surgeon and the hospital could not be held liable
under a theory of vicarious liability); Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 I11.
App. 3d
1055, 313 N.E.2d 255 (1st Dist. 1974) (hospital held vicariously liable when an employee
of hospital assisted a physician who retained some degree of control over the assisting
employee, and the employee remained within the bounds of her employment); Kober v.
Stewart, 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966) (when a physician acts an an agent for the
hospital in performing his services pursuant to the rules of the hospital medical staff, a
contract that does not explicitly refer to the physician as an independent contractor may
be merely the means by which a hospital hires the physician); Arthur v. St. Peter's Hosp.,
169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979) (hospital liable for physician's negligence when
hospital held out the physician as its agent or employee and the patient accepted treatment from the physician reasonably believing that such treatment was rendered on behalf
of the hospital); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978)
(hospital liable when it holds itself out to the public as a provider of medical care and the
public reasonably believes that a physician is employed by the hospital to deliver that
service and the public is not advised to the contrary).
34. FURROW, supra note 22, at 169.
35. Id.
36. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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fair dealings. It should be discarded.""
Today, a hospital may be held vicariously liable for an act or
omission of an agent, or one deemed to be an agent, that causes
injury to another. 3 The doctrine of vicarious liability applies to an
agent of a hospital, or one deemed to be an agent, such as physicians,39 physical therapists, laboratory technicians, respiratory
therapists, and nurses.4°
C.

CorporateNegligence

From the 1960's to the 1970's, the focus of liability changed
from the hospital-physician relationship 41 to an analysis of the hospital's role in providing quality patient care.4 2 In the landmark
37. Id. at 667, 143 N.E.2d at 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11. But see Cooper v. Curry, 92
N.M. 417, 421, 589 P.2d 201, 209 (1978) (hospital not liable for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff because the physician was not an employee of the hospital or engaged in a joint
venture with the hospital). Generally, the judiciary has taken two differerlt approaches in
determining a hospital's vicarious liability. See generally FURROW, supra note 22, at 16577. The first approach, the "captain-of-the-ship" rule, is based upon the degree of control
that the party in command has over the actions of the party who committed the wrongful
act. Id. at 168. See Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 313 N.E.2d
255 (1st Dist. 1974). The second approach, based on the laws of agency, is the more
important concept in the area of medical malpractice because most physicians are not
employees of the hospitals in which they practice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
states the following:
[O]ne who represents that another is his agent and thereby causes a third party
to justifiably rely upon the care of such agent is subject to liability to the third
party for harm caused by the lack of care of the one appearing to be an agent as
if he were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
In Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980), an
Ohio court applied the doctrine of vicarious liability to include non-employee, independent contractor physicians. Id. at 68-69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192. The Hannola court justified
the imposition of liability on the part of the hospital by redefining the hospital's right to
control the mode and manner of the physician's work. Id.
38. Note, supra note 2, at 564.
39. See supra note 37.
40. The doctrine was applied in Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill.
2d 411, 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973). Ohligschlager was admitted to the defendant hospital for
the treatment of dehydration necessitating the insertion of an intravenous (I.V.) catheter
for the administration of feedings and medications. Id. at 415, 303 N.E.2d at 395. Ohligschlager's arm was severly damaged from the seepage of fluids and medications into
the tissues of the arm. Id. at 414, 303 N.E.2d at 395. The fluids and medications should
have been contained in the vein. Id. Expert testimony revealed that the nursing staff had
a duty to periodically observe the I.V. site. Id. at 420, 303 N.E.2d at 397. The court held
the hospital vicariously liable for the injury suffered by Ohligschlager for failing to properly supervise a nurse performing a routine nursing function. Id.
41. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text for discussion of vicarious liability.
42. The court in Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984), stated
that, "[t]he doctrine of corporate negligence reflects the public's perception of the modem
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decision of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,43
the Illinois Supreme Court held the hospital directly liable for the
failure of its administrators and staff to monitor and supervise
44
properly the delivery of health care rendered within its confines.
The court noted that a hospital was responsible for maintaining
proper standards of professional conduct and establishing methods
to evaluate patient care.4 s According to Darling,therefore, a.hospital has an affirmative and non-delegable duty to protect the wellbeing of its patients."
In Slater v. Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart,47 the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District expanded the duty established in Darling.45 In Slater, the court held that a hospital has a
duty to protect a patient by exercising the degree of reasonable care
that the patient's pre-existing condition would require.49 Unlike
Darling,in which the hospital was required to be aware only of the
injury being treated, the Slater court required the hospital to be
hospital as a multifaceted health care facility responsible for the quality of medical care
and treatment rendered." Id. at 231, 677 P.2d at 169.
43. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). Darling, a college football player, was
treated for a broken leg in the defendant hospital's emergency room where the treating
physician applied a cast in a manner that impeded adequate blood flow. Id. at 328, 211
N.E.2d at 255. Darling complained of severe pain and swollen and discolored toes, yet
no physician or other hospital staff member removed the cast. Id. The leg festered and
rotted in the cast, ultimately resulting in the amputation of Darling's leg below the knee.
Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
44. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. The defendant hospital was liable for breach of a
duty to "conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent
risk." Id. at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
45. Id. at 339, 211 N.E.2d at 261.
46. Id. at 332-33, 211 N.E.2d at 257-58. See Molchan & Sinn supra note 5, at 27-7.
See also Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (hospital has a non-delegable
duty to provide non-negligent physician care in its emergency room even though the
emergency room physicians are hired as independent contractors); Crawford County
State Bank v. Grady, 161 Il.App. 3d 332, 514 N.E.2d 532 (4th Dist. 1987) (although
hospital held liable under several other theories, the court specifically held the hospital
liable under an independent duty to provide care theory). Compare Darling (affirmative
duty to treat) with Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235
N.E.2d 571 (1968). The court in Lundahi held that when a failure to act results from a
medical decision within the discretion of a physician, the hospital cannot be found negligent for failure to act to rectify the physician's omission. Id. at 466, 235 N.E.2d at 674.
In essence, the court concluded that Darlingdid not require the hospital to affirmatively
treat the patient, but rather, to seek treatment by consulting physicians when it becomes
apparent that the attending physician is incompetent. Id.
47. 20 Ill. App. 3d 464, 314 N.E.2d 715 (1st Dist. 1974).
48. Id. Slater was admitted to the hospital for a hernia operation. Id. at 466, 314
N.E.2d at 717. The hospital did not know that Slater was an alcoholic and mentally
disturbed when he jumped from his hospital room window while suffering from delirium
tremens. Id. at 467, 314 N.E.2d at 717.
49. Id. at 469, 314 N.E.2d at 719.
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aware of a patient's pre-existing condition that was not directly
related to the treatment being administered to the patient. 50
The doctrine of corporate negligence was further expanded in
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital5 1 when the Illinois Supreme Court
extended a hospital's liability to a non-patient third party. 52 The
court held that, although the one to whom the duty was owed was
not in existence at the time of the wrongful act, the injury sus-

tained was a reasonably foreseeable injury. 53 The court noted that,

as medical science technology advanced, the concept
of legal duty
54
changed from a static concept to a dynamic one.
In Darling,Slater, and Renslow, the hospital had an obligation
to be aware of the medical care that it rendered. 55 In Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hospital,5 6 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District imposed a greater obligation on the hospital by holding that
the hospital not only must supervise the care rendered, but also
must intervene between the patient and physician to provide reasonable and proper treatment. 57 The court based its holding on a
breach of the standard of care established in the hospital's bylaws.58 The bylaws required the hospital to exercise reasonable ef50. Id. at 469-70, 314 N.E.2d at 719.
51. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). In Renslow, the plaintiff's mother received a transfusion of incompatible blood eight years before the conception of the plaintiff. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251. The plaintiff infant was in a non-existent state at the
time of the wrongful act, and therefore, was a third party to the negligent act of the
tortfeasors. Id. The blood transfusion caused permanent brain damage to the plaintiff at
birth. Id. at 349-50, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
52. Id. at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 357-58, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
55. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
56. 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1st Dist. 1979). Two and one-half months
after admission to the defendant hospital, it was discovered that Johnson had a fractured
hip from the automobile accident that precipitated his admission. Id. at 711, 399 N.E.2d
at 200. When Johnson's attending physician requested an orthopedic consult for the fractured hip, the hospital's orthopedic surgeon refused to examine Johnson. Id. In compliance with the hospital bylaws, the attending physician notified the hospital
administration of the orthopedic surgeon's refusal to examine Johnson. Id. The bylaws
established the hospital administration's authority to take corrective measures when a
consulted physician fails to fulfill his obligation to comply with the requested consult
when such failure is below acceptable medical practice. Id. at 717, 399 N.E.2d at 205.
The hospital administration failed to intervene to insure that Johnson received proper
and adequate treatment for his fractured hip. Id. at 718, 399 N.E.2d at 201. One month
after discovering the broken hip, Johnson died, allegedly due to complications arising
from the fracture, without ever being examined by an orthopedic surgeon. Id. at 711,
399 N.E.2d at 201.
57. Id. at 716, 399 N.E.2d at 204.
58. Id. at 718, 399 N.E.2d at 205. Evidence of hospital standards can be found not
only in hospital bylaws but also in professional customs, hospital accreditation, regula-
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forts to insure that its patients received adequate care.5 9
D.

Strict Liability

In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Suvada v. White Motor
Co.," adopted the concept of strict liability in tort as the basis for a
claim. 6' The Suvada court extended strict liability to products
other than food.6 2 Five years later, in Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital,6 3 the Illinois Supreme Court applied the strict
liability in tort doctrine in a medical malpractice case. 64 In Cunningham, the court held a hospital strictly liable for selling an intions and professional organization requirements applicable to hospitals. See Note, supra
note 2, at 579.
59. Johnson, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 718, 399 N.E.2d at 205.
60. 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
61. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 188. The court rejected the pre-1965 notion that the
theory of strict liability must be premised solely on either an express or implied warranty
or on a contract between the parties. Id.
In strict liability actions, the seller of a product is held to the standard described in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the

seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to reach the user or consumer in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTIS § 402A (1965). The rule applies to persons engaged
in the business of selling products as well as to distributors, dealers, and manufacturers of
such products. Id. at comment f.
In a strict liability claim, it is not necessary to prove that the manufacturer or seller of
a product is negligent. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L. 5, 13
(1965). If a product leaves the control of the manufacturer or seller in an unreasonably
unsafe condition, the manufacturer or seller is liable whether or not he produced the
dangerous condition or failed to recognize and correct the dangerous condition. Id. at 15.
The dangerously unsafe product is the focus of the liability, rather than the manufacturer
or seller's conduct, id., which is distinct from actions in either vicarious liability or corporate negligence.
62. Suvada, 32 Il1.2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The court held that liability should
be extended for the following three reasons: (1) the public interest in human life and
health, (2) the manufacturer's invitations and solicitations to use the product and its
representations that the product is safe and suitable for use, and (3) the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit. Id.
63. 47 Il. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
64. Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904. In Cunningham, the plaintiff contracted serum
hepatitis after receiving a transfusion of blood while hospitalized. Id. at 445, 266 N.E.2d
at 898. The plaintiff then sought damages on a theory of strict tort liability. Id. The
court held that the hospital sold an inherently dangerous product by providing blood for
a transfusion. Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904. In response to the Cunningham decision,
the Illinois legislature passed a statute that specifically rejects the imposition of strict
liability in tort rule for services involving blood and blood products. ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
111/2, para. 5102 (1985).
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herently dangerous product.65
In Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co.,66 the Illinois Supreme Court
expanded the strict liability in tort doctrine when it held that a
failure to warn of a product's dangerous propensities may serve as
a basis for holding a manufacturer or seller strictly liable in tort. 7
The failure to warn theory in strict liability was limited in Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co. 61 when the Illinois Supreme Court focused on the nature of the product and the adequacy of the
warning, rather than the conduct of a manufacturer or seller. 69 In
Woodhill, the court required that an injured party prove that a
manufacturer or seller knew or should have known of the danger
that caused the injury. 70 Accordingly, a manufacturer or seller of a
product is strictly liable when the manufacturer or seller knows or
should have known of the dangerous propensities of a product and
fails to disclose the dangers.71
III. KIRK V. MICHAEL REESE HOSPITAL
A. Factual Background
Daniel McCarthy was under treatment as a psychiatric patient
at Michael Reese Hospital when his psychiatrists ordered that McCarthy be given two psychotropic prescription drugs, 72 Prolixin
Decanoate ("Prolixin") and Thorazine. 3 The hospital pharmacy
65. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
66. 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976).
67. Id. at 551, 356 N.E.2d at 784.
68. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
69. Id. at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
70. Id. The court held that when an inherently unsafe product is accompanied by
proper warnings, it is no longer defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. Id.
71. Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199. Although the allegation of a breach of the duty to
warn is similar to an action sounding in negligence, the focus of such an allegation is
whether it would have been reasonable for a drug manufacturer or seller to have given a
warning. Id. at 34, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
72. A psychotropic drug alters the behavior, experience, or psychic function of one
who ingests the drug. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1411 (15th ed.
1986).
73. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp., 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 949, 483 N.E.2d 906, 909 (1st
Dist. 1985), rev'd, 117 I1. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d'387 (1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 99
L.Ed. 2d 236 (1988).
Prolixin is a "highly potent behavior modifier with a markedly extended duration of
effect." PHYSICIANs' DESK REFERENCE 1497 (30th ed. 1976). Thorazine is described as
a psychotropic drug. Id. at 1457. Both drugs carry a warning that the drug could impair
the patient's mental and physical abilities, and, therefore, that the patient should avoid
the consumption of alcohol and the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of the drug. Id. at 1497, 1457, respectively. This warning has been associated with
these two drugs since their introduction in the market and can currently be found in the
PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE (41st ed. 1987).
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dispensed the drugs and hospital personnel administered the
Prolixin as an injection and the Thorazine as an oral agent. 74 Just
hours after administering the drugs to McCarthy, the hospital discharged him, allegedly without warning him about the dangers associated with the use of the two drugs." After he was discharged,
McCarthy drank an alcoholic beverage and then drove his automobile in which the plaintiff, Kirk, was a passenger.7 6 McCarthy lost
control of his automobile and hit a tree." Kirk suffered severe and
permanent injuries in the accident. 8
Kirk alleged that the physicians and hospital were negligent for
failing to warn McCarthy of the adverse effects of the psychotropic
drugs.79 In addition, Kirk sought recovery from the hospital on a
strict liability theory.80 Kirk alleged that because the hospital
failed to warn McCarthy of the adverse effects of the drugs, the
drugs became an unreasonably dangerous product.8 ' Finally, Kirk
sought recovery from McCarthy
for McCarthy's alleged negligent
2
operation of his automobile.1
B.

The Majority Opinion
1. Strict Liability

Justice Ward's opinion for a four-member majority began with a
discussion of the strict liability issue as it applied to the hospital
74. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
75. Id. at 514-15, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
76. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
77. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390-91.
78. Id. James Kirk sustained a spinal injury in the accident resulting in quadreplegia,
necessitating confinement to a wheelchair. Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing in the
Supreme Court of Illinois 1 (1987).
79. Kirk, 117 Il. 2d at 514-15, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
80. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court consolidated all causes of action, except for the negligence count
against McCarthy, on the appeal of the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 513-14, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
The appellate court considered whether the doctors, hospital and drug manufacturers
owed a duty to McCarthy. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 950, 483 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1st
Dist. 1985), rev'd, 117 I1. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987). The appellate court concluded
that each defendant had a duty to adequately warn McCarthy of the dangers associated
with the use of the psychotropic drugs in conjunction with consuming alcohol and operating an automobile. Id. at 955, 483 N.E.2d at 913. The court ruled that the duty owed
McCarthy implicitly extended to members of the general public. Id. at 956, 483 N.E.2d
at 914. In addition, the appellate court held the hospital strictly liable for a failure to
warn of the adverse side effects of the drugs rendering the drugs unreasonably dangerous.
Id. Although the court addressed all of the allegations, the focus of this Note is limited
to the allegations against the hospital.
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and the drug manufacturer."' The court recognized that, under the

theory of strict liability,8 manufacturers and sellers in the original
chain of production have a legal duty to warn about the proper use
of their products when they place unreasonably dangerous products in the mainstream of society.85 The court noted that, under a
strict liability theory, a plaintiff's injury must be reasonably foreseeable.8 6 The court explained that if an injury is reasonably foreseeable from a defective product, the duty of care extends not only
to the original users or consumers, 87but also to those persons
outside the original purchasing chain.
In Kirk, the court first concluded that the drug manufacturer
was not required to provide warnings to any hospital personnel,
other than physicians, because the hospital personnel were not responsible for prescribing drug therapy for the hospital's patients.88
Accordingly, the court held that the drug manufacturer had no
duty to warn McCarthy directly.8 9 The court reasoned that the
drug manufacturer could not reasonably foresee either that the
drugs would be dispensed or administered without warnings issued
by McCarthy's physicians, or that McCarthy would be discharged
from the hospital, consume alcohol, operate and lose control of his
car, hit a tree, and injure Kirk, his passenger, all in the same day.'
Second, regarding the liability of the hospital, the court recognized that the hospital was in the chain of distribution as the supplier of the drugs. 91 The court applied the learned intermediary
doctrine 92 to the hospital, however, and held that the hospital was.
not liable under a strict liability theory.93 The court reasoned that
83. Kirk, 117 11. 2d at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 391. The majority's discussion of strict
liability with respect to the drug manufacturer is significant to this Note only to the
extent that the court applied the discussion of the drug manufacturer to its application of
strict liability and negligence with respect to the hospital.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
85. Kirk, 117 Il. 2d at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
86. Id. at 519-20, 513 N.E.2d at 393 (citing Winnett v. Winnett, 57 II. 2d 7, 10, 310
N.E.2d 1, 3 (1974)).
87. Kirk, 117 II1. 2d at 520, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
88. Id. at 523, 513 N.E.2d at 395 (citing Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 Ill. 2d
282, 415 N.E.2d 390 (1980) and Dubin v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 Ill. 2d 277, 415

N.E.2d 350 (1980)).
89. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
90. Id. at 521, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
91. Id. at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
92. The learned intermediary doctrine states that a drug manufacturer's duty to warn
extends to the physician and no further. The physician is expected to apply his medical
knowledge, training, and expertise to decide what drugs to order and what warnings to
issue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
93. Kirk, 117 Il1. 2d at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
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the physicians were in an intermediate position between the hospital and the patient. Therefore, the hospital could not reasonably
foresee that the drugs would be dispensed without the appropriate
warnings . 4 Also, because the hospital could not reasonably foresee that the drugs would be dispensed without warnings, the court
held that the hospital had no duty to warn Kirk, a non-patient,
non-user of the drug. 95
2.

Vicarious Liability

After analyzing the strict liability issue, the Kirk court considered the hospital's negligence under the vicarious liability theory. 6
The court agreed with the hospital's assertion that the duty to issue
warnings is in the discretion of the attending physician, and that
the hospital bore no liability for the physician's failure to provide
such warnings.97 The court ruled, therefore, that the plaintiff's
complaint failed to establish a theory to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the misconduct of either the physicians or any
other hospital personnel. 98 The court noted that a duty imposed
upon hospital personnel to provide warnings to patients to guard
against injuries, such as that suffered by Kirk, would be very burdensome because such injuries are not reasonably foreseeable by
hospital employees. 99
3.

Corporate Negligence

Regarding the hospital's liability under a negligence theory, the
court focused on whether the hospital had an independent duty to
warn "based on ordinary principles of professional malpractice,"
and further, whether that duty would extend to injured third parties.1 eo Under the independent duty theory, the court noted that
Kirk, as a third party, must establish that the hospital owed him a
02
legal duty"' not premised solely on the factor of foreseeability.
94. Id. at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395. The court noted that the complaint failed to establish liability on a respondeat superior theory for the actions of any hospital employee or
agent. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
100. Id. at 525-26, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
101. Id. at 525, 513 N.E.2d at 395-96 (citing Teter v. Clemens, 112 I1. 2d 252, 256,
492 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (1986)).
102. Id. at 525, 513 N.E.2d at 396 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y.
339, 342-43, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)).
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The court noted that consideration of other factors was necessary
to determine whether a duty is owed by the hospital.10 3 Specifically, the court listed factors such as the likelihood of an injury
occurring, the burden placed upon the hospital to avoid such an
injury, and the consequence of the hospital carrying that burden. 10°
The court referred to its discussion of foreseeability in the strict
liability issue to conclude that Kirk did not suffer a reasonably
foreseeable injury. 05 Regarding the other necessary factors, the
court held that, as a matter of public policy, it would be unduly
burdensome to hold the hospital liable for injuries to third party
6
nonpatients who had no special relationship to the hospital"1
Furthermore, the court stated that holding the hospital liable for
Kirk's injury would be an extreme hardship when the duty to issue
warnings is in the discretion of the attending physician. 0 7 According to the court, Kirk failed to establish that the hospital owed him
a duty of care and, therefore, the corporate negligence count
against the hospital failed.10 8
IV.

ANALYSIS

The majority, by holding the hospital not liable for the injury
sustained by Kirk,"09 failed to recognize that modem hospitals
have a duty to render safe medical care.110 The purpose of this
Note is to argue, first, that a hospital should require its physicians
to adhere to certain basic guidelines and, second, that a hospital
should be responsible for its failure to monitor adherence to such
guidelines.
The nature and scope of "basic guidelines" are unclear and
should be explored carefully by both the courts and the legislature.
At the very least, in the area of prescription drugs, a hospital
should insist upon appropriate warnings when all standard refer103. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396 (citing Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill. 2d 516, 518, 224
N.E.2d 231, 232 (1967)).
104. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397. Cf. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 62 Ill. 2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The transfer of a
duty to a third party plaintiff was permitted in Renslow because the infant's injuries occuffed as a direct result of the negligent acts of the hospital to the infant's mother and
because a special relationship existed between infant and mother. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d
at 1255.
107. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
108. Id. at 528, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
109. Id.
110. See Darling, 33 111. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
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ence materials indicate such warnings are necessary. Moreover, a
hospital should be held liable when physicians with practicing privileges at that hospital do not provide such warnings. In the area of
prescription drugs, the ramifications of the Kirk decision are very
troubling. The decision relieves a hospital from responsibility
when it discharges a patient without warning the patient of the
adverse side effects of the drugs it has administered.
A. Strict Liability
The Kirk court improperly dismissed the action in strict liability
against the hospital. The court based its dismissal of the first element of the strict liability count against the hospital, the issue of an
unreasonably dangerous product in the line of distribution, on a
faulty construction of the learned intermediary doctrine. 1 Because the court viewed the physician as a learned intermediary between the patient and the hospital, the court ruled that no liability
existed on the part of the hospital. 1 2 The learned intermediary
doctrine, however, provides protection for drug manufacturers,13
not hospitals. The learned intermediary doctrine should not be applied to hospitals because a hospital's relationship to the patient is
different from a drug manufacturer's relationship to the patient.
Unlike a drug manufacturer, a hospital holds itself out to the public as a full service provider of quality medical care. 14 In light of
the hospital's direct relationship with the public, the court should
not have applied the learned intermediary doctrine to hospitals.
Finally, even if the court concluded that the learned intermediary doctrine applies to hospitals, the court should have limited the
doctrine's application. Although the court in Kirk recognized that
a seller of products has a duty to warn of unreasonably dangerous
products,1 5 the court misconstrued the learned intermediary doctrine's application to Michael Reese Hospital. 16 If a seller of products has a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of a product's
dangerous propensities,11 7 then "[t]his duty exists even when there
is an intermediary in the chain of distribution who takes some con111. For a discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine, see supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
112. Kirk, 117 Il.2d at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
113. Id. at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 392.
114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
116. Id. at 522-23, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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trol over the product and who may himself be negligent."1 8 Because Michael Reese Hospital dispenses drugs and charges for
them, it should be considered a seller of the drugs,'" 9 which exerts
some control over the products. A hospital must decide which
drugs to order from the various manufacturers for the hospital
pharmacy. Physicians then order drugs that are available from the
hospital pharmacy. If the court had correctly applied the learned
intermediary doctrine, the court, in placing the physician in the
learned intermediary position between the hospital, as seller of the
drugs, and the patient,12 0 as the recipient, would have found the
hospital liable. This is true regardless of whether the physician exerted some control by choosing which drugs to dispense and regardless of whether the physician himself was negligent in failing
to issue the appropriate warnings. The hospital, as seller of the
drugs, still has a duty to warn the patient of the drugs' dangerous
propensities. Classifying the physician as an intermediary should
not destroy the hospital's duty to warn, nor should it excuse the
breach of that duty.
Regarding foreseeability, the second element of a strict liability
action, the hospital knew or should have known of the unreasonably dangerous condition that the failure to warn of the adverse effects would create. The adverse effects of the drugs prescribed
were contained in the drug package inserts 2' that accompanied the
drugs when distributed to the hospital. The adverse effects also
were described in the Physicians' Desk Reference. Both the drug
package inserts and the Physicians' Desk Reference are available
readily in any hospital pharmacy.1 22 The court's argument that the
injury was not reasonably foreseeable by the hospital 2 3 is without
Reingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
L. REV. 947, 985-86 (1964). See, e.g., Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958) (dealer failed to inspect product); United States v. Lobb, 192 F.
Supp. 461 (W.D. Ky. 1961) (manufacturer informed dealer of defect but dealer sold prod118.

RUT.

uct without informing buyer of same). The reason for imposing liability on the manufacturer in such cases is that it is foreseeable to the manufacturer that the intermediary may
fail to warn the ultimate user or consumer of the defect. Reingold supra at 986 n.222.
119. See Cunningham, supra notes 63-65.
120. Kirk, 117 I11.2d at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
121. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 n.2, 483 N.E.2d 906, 911 n.2 (1st Dist. 1985).
122. Id.
123. The manufacturer details in a package insert the uses and contraindications of
the medication that accompanies every package of medication distributed to the pharmacist. Brushwood, The Informed Intermediary Doctrine and the Pharmacist's Duty to
Warn, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 349, 356 (1983). Although the physicians may not have ready
access to the drug inserts, the same information is printed in the Physicians' Desk Reference. Id.
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merit considering that the plaintiff's injury was of the exact nature
of the warnings. 24 Accordingly, Kirk should have been permitted
to proceed against the hospital under a theory of strict liability.
B.

Vicarious Liability

In discussing the plaintiff's allegation of the hospital's negligence, the court agreed with the hospital's defense that the duty to
disclose was the responsibility of the physician in exercising his
medical judgment. 2 5 The majority erred in accepting the hospital's defense because the issue was not whether the physicians improperly exercised medical judgment. Rather, the issue was
whether the hospital was vicariously liable because of the failure of
one of its agents or employees to warn McCarthy of the adverse
effects of the drugs.
A hospital is vicariously liable when the acts or omissions of its
agents or employees cause injury to another. 2 6 A hospital "has a
duty to review the quality of patient care [rendered] and [to] provide safeguards to insure that [the hospital] staff, agents and servants perform their duties with reasonable care.2' 2 The physician
acts as an agent for the hospital when he is subject to the rules and
regulations of the institution, when the hospital may discharge the
physician from practicing at the institution by withdrawing the
physician's privileges, and when the hospital furnishes the equipment and laboratories that the physician relies upon to render
medical care. 28 In Kirk, the physicians acknowledged their failure
to issue the necessary warnings when administering psychotropic
drugs. 129 Because the hospital failed to insure that the physicians,
124. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
125. Kirk, 117 I1. 2d at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395. Apparently, the court's decision
rested in part on the court's finding that the plaintiff failed in his third amended complaint to establish vicarious liability on the part of the hospital through the actions of the
physicians or other hospital personnel. Id. When the information needed to plead facts
is within the knowledge or control of the defendant, however, the plaintiff is not required
to plead with specificity. See Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 655, 658, 410
N.E.2d 969, 972 (1st Dist. 1980). For the purpose of determining whether the complaint
sufficiently supports a cause of action, the fact that treatment was rendered on the defendant hospital's premises creates permissible presumption that an agency-plincipal relationship exists. Id. at 659, 410 N.E.2d at 973. The court, therefore, should have permitted
the plaintiff to proceed on his complaint without alleging the specific facts when the hospital was aware, through its records, of which agents of the hospital were involved.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957). See supra note 37.
127. Cooper v. Curry, 92 N.M. 417, 423, 589 P.2d 201, 207 (1978).
128. Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1060, 313 N.E.2d 255,
261 (1st Dist. 1974).
129. Kirk, 117 I1. 2d at 534, 513 N.E.2d at 400 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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as its agents, performed their duties with reasonable care, the hospital should be found vicariously liable.
The court also should have held the hospital vicariously liable
for breaching its duty to supervise or regulate the actions of an
employee, the pharmacist who dispensed the drugs, for his failure
to perform his duties in a safe manner. A hospital exerts control
over a pharmacist as an employee, not only through the hospital
rules and regulations, but also because the hospital compensates
the pharmacist. Liability is established when the hospital has
failed to supervise the pharmacy to insure
that the pharmacist car30
ried out his duties in a safe manner.
The pharmacist, as a professional hospital employee, failed to
apply his knowledge and training about pharmaceuticals to provide the required warning to McCarthy. 131 The drug distribution
system provides a built-in method of communication between the
drug manufacturers and pharmacists by giving the pharmacist ac32
cess both to drug inserts and to the Physicians' Desk Reference.

The availability of these reference materials establishes that the
pharmacist employed by Michael Reese Hospital knew or should
have known of the adverse effects that the psychotropic drugs
would have on McCarthy's ability to safely operate his car when
130. See Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1060, 313 N.E.2d
255, 261 (1st Dist. 1974) (hospital held vicariously liable when an employee of hospital
assisted a physician who retained some degree of control over the assisting employee, and
the employee remained within the bounds of her employment).
131. Standards of Practice for the Profession of Pharmacy, Section III, Responsibility Six (cited in Kalman & Schlegel, Standardsof Practicefor the Professionof Pharmacy,
19 AMERICAN PHARMACY, Mar., 1979 at 21, 31) states that a pharmacist shall
"[a]dvise] patient[s] of potential drug-related ...conditions which may develop from the
use of the medication. . .

."

Id. See generally Brushwood, supra note 123, at 349.

A pharmacist's formal training prepares him with an in-depth knowledge of
pharmacotherapeutics in order to practice in the clinical environment of a hospital. Id. at
351. The combination of a pharmacist's formal training and the practical application of
such knowledge in the hospital places the pharmacist in an optimal situation to provide
patients with drug information. Id. The changing professional role of a pharmacist over
the past decade has resulted in the emergence of clinical pharmacy, a patient-oriented
professional service, rather than the traditional product-oriented service. Id. at 351 n.7.
The American Society of Hospital Pharmacists encourages hospital-based pharmacists to
provide drug information to the patients. Id. at 350, n. 3. In Illinois, the pharmacist only
is advised strongly to provide the patient with drug information, whereas other states
mandate patient counseling. Id. at 352 n.9. The modern pharmacist has assumed greater
responsibility in counseling his patients and, thus, has established a duty owing to his
patients. Morgan, PharmacistLiability, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 315, 328 (Annual, 1987).
See Hand v. Krakowski, 89 A.D.2d 650, 651, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23 (1982) (pharmacist has a duty to warn of dangers of interactions between alcohol and psychotropic drugs
when the pharmacist has knowledge of the contraindications of such combinations).
132. Brushwood, supra note 123, at 356.
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combined with the consumption of alcohol. The court erred in
holding that the injury suffered by Kirk was not reasonably foreseeable to the hospital pharmacist, as a hospital employee, 3 3 because the injury suffered by Kirk was of the exact nature of the
warning found in the reference materials available to hospital
employees.
Finally, the hospital should have been held vicariously liable for
failing to insure reasonable patient care by the nurse who administered the oral agent Thorazine and the injection Prolixin. Nurses
34
have a duty to protect the well-being and safety of their patients,'
and therefore, bear the responsibility of teaching patients about the
drugs they receive. 135 A nurse's formal training prepares that
nurse to administer medications only after being cognizant of the
drug's actions, interactions, dosages, and side effects.136 A nurse
has access to drug information through various resources including
the Physicians' Desk Reference and the hospital pharmacy.
The nurse who administered the psychotropic drugs to McCarthy knew or should have known of the side effects that the drugs
might have on McCarthy's ability to operate his car when combined with the consumption of alcohol. The court erred in holding
that the injury, suffered by Kirk was not reasonably foreseeable to
hospital employees 37 when the injury suffered by Kirk was of the
exact nature or consequence of the warning found in the reference
materials available to hospital employees. Neither the nurse nor
any other hospital employee informed McCarthy of the adverse effects of the psychotropic drugs administered to him prior to his
discharge from the hospital and, therefore, the hospital should
have been found vicariously liable for the negligent actions of its
employees.
C.

CorporateNegligence

In addition to his claims against the hospital under the theories
of strict liability and vicarious liability, the plaintiff should have
133.

Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395.

134. Nursing practice includes, but is not limited to, the administeration, teaching,
and evaluation of the practice and execution of the medical regimen. This includes the
administeration of medications and treatments prescribed by an authorized person. Each
registered nurse is directly accountable and responsible to the consumer for the quality of
nursing care rendered. American Nurses' Association, THE NURSING PRACTICE ACT
Suggested State Legislation 6 (1981).

135.

B.

136.
137.

Id.
Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395.

BERGERSEN, PHARMACOLOGY IN NURSING

1, 87 (13th ed. 1976).
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been permitted to proceed against the hospital under a theory of
corporate negligence. 3 8 Michael Reese Hospital is a large medical
corporate facility that is competitive in the health care industry
and has a well-deserved reputation for providing quality medical
care. Because the hospital benefits from representing itself as a
quality health care provider, it has an affirmative duty to maintain
high medical standards. 139 Further, the patient justly deserves the
right to rely on this representation.' 40 A hospital that fails in its
affirmative duty to render quality medical care should be liable for
the resultant injuries.' 4 1 In Kirk, the defendant breached its duty
to provide adequate and safe medical care to McCarthy by failing
to warn him of the adverse effects of the psychotropic drugs it administered to him. 42 This failure to warn resulted in an injury to
an innocent third party, 43 and recovery should have been
permitted.
The plaintiff in Kirk asserted that the hospital had an "independent duty" to warn McCarthy and, further, that this duty
extended to third parties.' 44 The court not only failed to recognize
the independent duty concept, but also misconstrued the plaintiff's
argument. According to the court, the plaintiff alleged that
although Kirk had no special relationship with the doctors or the
hospital, Kirk should have been permitted to proceed in an action
for the alleged negligent treatment of another. The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument and held that the responsibility to warn
rested solely with McCarthy's attending physicians. 4 The majority failed to recognize that the "independent duty" concept, as created in Darling, established the affirmative duty of a hospital in a
corporate negligence claim.'" This affirmative and non-delegable
duty owed to McCarthy to warn of the adverse effects of the
psychotropic drugs imposed upon the hospital a duty of reasonable
conduct for the protection of Kirk.
The court recognized that the existence of a legal duty is premised upon whether the harm suffered was reasonably foresee138. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
139. See Darling, 33 Il. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258 (1965) (discussion of the affirmative duty imposed upon hospitals).

140. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 231,677 P.2d 166, 169 (1984) (discussion of
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

the case theory of corporate negligence).
See Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 339, 211 N.E.2d at 261.
Kirk, 117 111. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 524-25, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 339, 211 N.E.2d at 261.
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able. "' In the context of corporate negligence, however, the
majority failed to discuss adequately the foreseeability of this type
of accident and the resulting injuries. The court erred in applying
to the corporate negligence action its finding of non-foreseeability
in connection with a strict liability theory, rather than evaluating
foreseeability as a separate issue under both theories.1 4 Furthermore, the court recognized that, in determining whether the hospital owed a duty to Kirk, the court must consider the current social
policies in the community where the action is raised.149 The court
inappropriately relied upon the Illinois legislature's goal of reducing medical malpractice damage awards to conclude that the hospital had no duty to warn McCarthy of the adverse effects of the
psychotropic drugs. The court should have evaluated the hospital
as a modern provider of health care with an independent duty to
render quality medical care.
D. An Alternative Theory
A public policy analogy could have provided the court with an
alternative theory of liability. This theory for liability was not considered by the court because the theory was not raised by the plaintiff. A bartender or seller of alcoholic beverages, in dispensing
intoxicating liquors to a patron, contributes to a patron's inebriated state. When the patron thereafter fails to operate his automobile in a safe manner and causes injury to an innocent third party,
the injured third party has a cause of action against thc bartender
or seller of the intoxicating liquors. 50 Although the bartender or
seller does not necessarily have any formal education or special
knowledge about the effects of intoxicating liquors, he is liable for
the injuries sustained.' 5 '
In comparison, the court in Kirk did not impose liability upon
the hospital for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff despite the
147. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 525, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
148. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
149. Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
150. Liquor Control Act of 1934 § 6-21 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para.
235 (1983)). Cf. Hopkins v. Powers, 113 111. 2d 206, 497 N.E.2d 757 (1986) (recovery
under Dramshop Act limited to innocent third parties who are injured as a result of the
sale or gift of alcoholic beverages); Fabian v. Polish Am. Veterans Ass'n, 126 Ill. App. 3d
80, 466 N.E.2d 1239 (1st Dist. 1984) (liability under Dramshop Act limited to those
engaged in the business of "selling" intoxicating beverages); Yangas v. Charlie Club, Inc.,
113 Ill. App. 3d 398, 447 N.E.2d 484 (3d Dist. 1983) (the court limits the duty of tavern
owners to exclude patrons that have been injured by one who was denied admission to the
tavern even though the attempted patron caused injury to patron in the parking lot).
151. Liquor Control Act, supra note 150.
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hospital personnel's formal training and special knowledge of the
adverse side effects of psychotropic drugs dispensed to McCarthy.' 5 2 The end result is the same in both situations: An innocent
third party is injured when a person under the influence of either
alcohol or drugs fails to safely operate his automobile. A legal
remedy is provided to a third party injured by a person under the
influence of alcohol, yet no similar provision is made for a third
party injured by a person under the influence of psychotropic drugs
administered in a hospital without proper warnings of the drugs
adverse effects. Logic, sound public policy, and equity dictate that
hospitals be held to the same standard as the seller of intoxicating
liquors.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The courts must recognize the public's expectation that modem
hospitals, as providers of quality medical care, should be viewed as
business enterprises with a commitment to maintain high standards of medical care in protecting the health and lives of their
patients. With respect to situations similar to Kirk, hospitals must
exercise due care in informing patients of the adverse effects of prescription drugs. Fifteen to twenty seconds must be taken to issue
the necessary warnings, rather than unduly burdening injured
third parties with the costs of an injury that a hospital had the
knowledge and ability to prevent. 15 3 As long as hospitals fail to
meet their affirmative duty to provide safe medical care by establishing stricter guidelines for drug administeration and regulation
within the hospital, the courts must protect the public by finding
hospitals liable for injuries to third parties that are proximately
caused by the hospitals' breach of their duty.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hospitals may suffer serious consequences for failing to provide
an acceptable level of medical care. The laws of medical malpractice no longer provide hospitals with a blanket immunity from liability. 1-4 Because modem hospitals represent themselves to the
public as providers of quality medical care, hospitals must be held
to a standard of medical care that protects the safety of their patients. Until hospitals become more actively and aggressively involved in the reduction of injuries resulting from wrongful acts for
152. Kirk, 117 Il. 2d at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390-91.
153. Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing in the Supreme Court of Illinois 1 (1987).
154. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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which the hospital is liable (as opposed to medical decisions that
may result in injury, but that do not represent an error in medical
judgment), the courts must provide the injured third party with a
legal remedy. To find otherwise is a grave injustice to society,
MONICA CLEMENTS BERRY

R.N., C.C.R.N., B.S.N.

